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Abstract 
In the US, defense R&D share of GDP has decreased significantly since 1960. To analyze 
the implications on growth and welfare, we develop an R&D-based growth model that features 
the crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D. The model also 
captures the effects of defense technology on (i) national security resembling consumption-type 
public goods and (ii) aggregate productivity via the spin-off effect resembling productive public 
goods. In this framework, economic growth is driven by market-based civilian R&D as in 
standard R&D-based growth models and government-financed public goods (i.e., defense R&D) 
as in Barro (1990). We find that defense R&D has an inverted-U effect on growth, and the 
growth-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in the spillover and spin-off effects. As 
for the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D, it is increasing in the security-enhancing 
effect of defense technology, and there exists a critical degree of this security-enhancing effect 
below (above) which the welfare-maximizing level is below (above) the growth-maximizing 
level. 
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1. Introduction 
In the US, defense R&D as a percentage of GDP decreased from 1.29% in 1961 to 0.57% in 
2008 (see Figure 1). This phenomenon has led to a number of studies on the effects of defense 
R&D on economic growth. For example, a recent empirical study by Goel et al. (2008) finds that 
defense R&D has a positive and significant effect on growth in the US. While it is interesting to 
analyze the growth effects of defense R&D, it is also important to consider its welfare effects 
given that growth maximization may not be equivalent to welfare maximization. To shed some 
light on this issue, we develop an R&D-based growth model to explore the different channels 
through which defense R&D affects growth and welfare. 
Specifically, we develop an R&D-based growth model that captures the commonly 
discussed crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D.1 The crowding-
out effect refers to the case in which an increase in defense R&D reduces the factor inputs 
available for civilian R&D and hence has a negative effect on the growth of civilian technology. 
For example, Hartley (2006) notes that “[d]efence R&D has obvious opportunity costs through 
the use of scarce scientific personnel and assets that could be used on civilian research.” Also, 
Gullec and van Pottelsberghe (2003) analyze a group of OECD countries and find that defense 
R&D indeed has a crowding-out effect on civilian R&D. The spillover effect refers to the case in 
which defense R&D contributes to the performance of civilian R&D and hence has a positive 
effect on growth. For example, Chakrabarti and Anyanwu (1993) find that defense R&D has an 
indirect positive effect on the growth rate of civilian output in the US through technological 
change for which the number of patents serves as a proxy, and they discuss how this empirical 
finding supports the presence of a spillover effect from defense R&D to the civilian economy. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Cowan and Foray (1995) and Dunne and Braddon (2008) for a discussion. 
Chu & Lai: Defense R&D 
 - 2 -
In addition to the crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D, our model also 
features two important effects of defense technology (which is accumulated by investment in 
defense R&D). Firstly, higher defense technology improves national security and increases the 
utility of households resembling consumption-type public goods. For example, Hartley (2006) 
argues that “[d]efense R&D increases a nation’s military capability so improving its national 
security through using technology (quality) rather than increasing the quantity of arms.” 
Secondly, defense technology improves aggregate productivity, resembling growth-enhancing 
public goods, through the development of general-purpose technologies (GPTs) that have civil 
applications. This effect is referred to as the spin-off effect in the defense literature. For example, 
Ruttan (2006) argues that research in defense has played an important role in the development of 
some major GPTs, such as (i) interchangeable parts and mass production, (ii) military and 
commercial aircraft, (iii) nuclear energy and electric power, (iv) computers and semiconductors, 
and (v) the internet. 
In our theoretical framework, economic growth is driven by market-based civilian R&D 
as in standard R&D-based growth models and government-financed public goods (i.e., defense 
R&D) as in Barro (1990). We find that a reduction in defense R&D leads to contrasting effects 
on the growth of output and consumption. In particular, starting at a high (low) level of defense 
R&D, reducing defense R&D has a positive (negative) effect on growth. Therefore, there exists a 
growth-maximizing level of defense R&D that is increasing in the spillover and spin-off effects. 
As for the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D, it is increasing in the security-enhancing 
effect of defense technology, and there is a critical degree of this security-enhancing effect below 
(above) which the welfare-maximizing level is below (above) the growth-maximizing level. 
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This study contributes to the literature on defense and economic growth by providing a 
tractable growth-theoretic framework that formalizes the commonly discussed crowding-out and 
spillover effects of defense R&D. To our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to model 
defense R&D within an R&D-based growth model. Previous studies analyze the dynamic effects 
of defense spending either in an endowment economy or in a capital-accumulation-driven growth 
model.2 For example, Shieh et al. (2002) perform a similar growth-welfare analysis on defense 
spending in an AK growth model and find that the welfare-maximizing level of defense spending 
is always above the growth-maximizing level. We derive a similar result under a special case of 
our growth model in which the production sector only employs unskilled labor. However, when 
the production sector also uses skilled labor, there is an additional crowding-out effect of defense 
R&D on the production of final goods. Consequently, whether the welfare-maximizing level of 
defense R&D is above or below the growth-maximizing level depends on the relative magnitude 
of this crowding-out effect versus the security-enhancing effect of defense technology. 
Our study also relates to the literature on productive government spending and economic 
growth initiated by Barro (1990). While Barro (1990) models public inputs as a flow variable, 
our study follows the formulation in Futagami et al. (1993) to model public inputs as a stock 
variable.3 The resulting spin-off effect of defense technology leads to an extra channel of growth 
via productive public goods in addition to market-based civilian R&D. Furthermore, we consider 
the security-enhancing effect of defense technology resembling consumption-type public goods 
as in Turnovsky (1996) and Shieh et al. (2002), among others. 
The theoretical implications of our study rationalize the results of previous empirical 
studies that find ambiguous growth effects of defense spending/R&D. In an early study, Benoit 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Brito (1972), Deger and Sen (1983, 1984), Zou (1995), Chang et al. (1996, 2002), Shieh et al. 
(2002, 2007) and Aizenman and Glick (2006). 
3 See Irmen and Kuehnel (2009) for a recent survey of this literature. 
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(1973) finds that defense spending has a positive effect on growth in developing countries. 
However, upon surveying the follow-up studies, Ram (1995) concludes that defense spending 
has opposing effects on growth and the overall effect is ambiguous.4 Similarly, Lichtenberg 
(1995) finds that defense R&D has opposing effects on growth and the net effect is ambiguous. 
In contrast, Goel et al. (2008) finds that defense R&D has a positive and significant effect on 
growth in the US, and surprisingly, this effect is even stronger than private industrial R&D. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
defines the equilibrium and analyzes the balanced-growth path. Section 4 examines the growth 
and welfare effects of defense R&D. The final section concludes with policy implications. 
 
2. A quality-ladder growth model with defense R&D 
We incorporate defense R&D into a modified version of the Grossman-Helpman (1991) quality-
ladder model, which is a workhorse model in the R&D-based growth literature. There are four 
effects of defense R&D in the model. Firstly, it has a positive spillover effect on civilian R&D. 
Secondly, it has a crowding-out effect on factor inputs for civilian R&D and production. Thirdly, 
defense technology improves national security and has a positive effect on households’ welfare. 
Finally, defense technology improves aggregate productivity through the spin-off effect. It is 
worth noting that defense R&D is a flow variable while defense technology is a stock variable. 
Although the quality-ladder model features only labor inputs, it is appropriate for our analysis 
because R&D scientists and engineers are the crucial inputs for innovation in civilian and 
defense technologies. Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, the familiar 
                                                 
4 For example, Macnair et al. (1995), Brumm (1997) and Murdoch et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between 
defense spending and growth as in Benoit (1973) while Deger and Smith (1983), Faini et al. (1984) and Deger (1986) 
find a negative relationship. Also, some studies, such as Biswas and Ram (1986) and Huand and Mintz (1990, 1991), 
find an insignificant effect of defense spending on growth. 
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components of the model will be briefly described to conserve space while the new features will 
be described in more details below. 
 
2.1. Households 
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a standard log utility function. 
(1) ∫∞ − +=
0
)ln(ln. dtdceU tt
t δρ , 
where 0>ρ  is the discount rate, and tc  is the consumption of final goods. td  is the level of 
defense technology, and its law of motion is )( ,tdtt hfdd =&  given an initial 0d  that is normalized 
to unity. The accumulation of defense technology is driven by defense R&D labor denoted by 
tdh ,  (to be discussed in more details later). As mentioned above, we follow previous studies to 
assume that households derive utility from national security for which the level of defense 
technology td  serves as a proxy.
5 In other words, defense technology resembles consumption-
type public goods, and the parameter 0≥δ  determines the degree of this security-enhancing 
effect of defense technology. 
Households maximize utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by 
(2) tttlthttt clwwvrv τ−−++= ,,& . 
tv  is the value of assets owned by households, and tr  is the real rate of return. Each household is 
endowed with one unit of high-skill labor (for production, civilian R&D, and defense R&D) and 
l  units of low-skill labor for production only. The market wage rates for high-skill and low-skill 
                                                 
5 This formulation captures Hartley’s (2006) argument (quoted in the introduction) that higher defense technology 
improves a country’s ability in defending its national interests against the threat of foreign rivals and hence increases 
the utility of households. 
Chu & Lai: Defense R&D 
 - 6 -
labors are thw ,  and tlw ,  respectively. The government levies a lump-sum tax tτ  to finance 
defense R&D.6 From utility maximization, the familiar Euler equation is ρ−= ttt rcc /& . 
 
2.2. Final goods 
Final goods ty  are produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a unit continuum of 
differentiated intermediates goods )(ixt  indexed by ]1,0[∈i . 
(3) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
)(lnexp diixy tt . 
This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output price and the input prices 
)(ipt  for ]1,0[∈i  as given. From profit maximization, the conditional demand function for )(ixt  
is )(/)( ipyix ttt =  for ]1,0[∈i . 
 
2.3. Intermediate goods 
There is a unit continuum of industries ]1,0[∈i  producing the differentiated intermediate goods. 
In each industry i, there is a temporary monopolistic leader, who holds a patent on the latest 
innovation and dominates the market until the next innovation occurs. The production function 
for the leader in industry i is  
(4) )()()( 1,,
)( ilihdzix txtxt
in
t
t θθα −= , 
where )(, ih tx  and )(, il tx  are respectively high-skill and low-skill production labors in industry i. 
The parameter )1,0(∈θ  determines the intensity of high-skill labor in production, and we will 
                                                 
6 We focus on a lump-sum tax to highlight the crowding-out effect of defense R&D. In the case of distortionary 
taxes, increasing defense R&D would naturally lead to other distortionary effects on the economy in addition to the 
crowding-out effect. 
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show that θ  captures the crowding-out effect of defense R&D on consumption. As discussed in 
Ruttan (2006), defense technology td  facilitates the development of GPTs and improves 
aggregate productivity as growth-enhancing public goods. The parameter )1,0(∈α  captures the 
degree of this spin-off effect of defense technology. As for technological progress from civilian 
R&D, 1>z  is the exogenous step size of each quality improvement, and )(int  is the number of 
quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t. 
From cost minimization, the marginal cost of production for the leader in industry i is  
(5) 
θθ
α θθ
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
,,
)( 1
1)( tlth
t
int
ww
dz
imc
t
. 
As is standard in the literature, the current and former leaders engage in Bertrand competition,7 
and the profit-maximizing price for the current leader is a constant markup (given by the quality 
step size z ) over the marginal cost (i.e., )()( . imczip tt = ).8 As a result, the amount of flow profit 
in industry ]1,0[∈i  is  
(6) ttttx yz
ziximczi ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=−= 1)()()1()(,π , 
where the second equality makes use of the conditional demand function )(/)( ipyix ttt = . 
 
2.4. Civilian R&D 
Denote the value of an invention in industry i as )(~ ivt . From (6), the amount of profit is the same 
across industries. As a result, tt viv ~)(~ =  in a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., an equal arrival rate of 
                                                 
7 Grossman and Helpman (1991) show that the next innovation must come from another innovator due to the Arrow 
displacement effect. 
8 Li (2001) considers a CES production function. In this case, the monopolistic markup is determined by either the 
quality step size or the elasticity of substitution depending on whether innovations are drastic or non-drastic. 
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innovation across industries).9 Because inventions are the only assets in the economy, their 
market value equals the aggregate value of households’ assets (i.e., tt vv =~ ). The no-arbitrage 
condition for tv  is  
(7) ttttxtt vvvr λπ −+= &, . 
The left-hand side of (7) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side of (7) is the sum of (i) the 
profit tx,π  generated by this asset, (ii) the potential capital gain tv& , and (iii) the expected capital 
loss due to creative destruction ttvλ , where tλ  is the aggregate Poisson arrival rate of innovation. 
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈j , and they hire high-
skill labor to create inventions. The expected profit for R&D entrepreneur j is 
(8) )()()( ,,, jhwjvj trthtttr −= λπ . 
)(, jh tr  is the number of civilian R&D workers hired by entrepreneur j, and the arrival rate of 
innovation for entrepreneur j is )()( , jhj trtt ϕλ = , where tϕ  is the productivity of civilian R&D. 
Free entry leads to zero expected profit in the R&D sector such that  
(9) thtt wv ,=ϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of high-skill labor between production and civilian 
R&D. To formalize the spillover effect of defense R&D, tϕ  is modeled as an increasing function 
in defense R&D tdh , .
10 For analytical tractability, we consider the following functional form 
(10) φϕϕ tdt h ,.= . 
                                                 
9 We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) 
for a theoretical justification for the symmetric equilibrium in quality-ladder models. 
10 For example, James (2004, p. 37-38) argues that defense R&D spending provides a crucial source of seed funding 
for civilian technology companies. 
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This functional form is tractable because the spillover effects of defense R&D is captured by a 
single parameter )1,0(∈φ . When φ  equals zero, the R&D sector reduces to the setup in the 
Grossman-Helpman model in which the productivity of civilian R&D is determined by ϕ . 
 
2.5. Defense R&D 
Government invests in defense R&D to improve defense technology according to  
(11) )( ,tdtt hfdd =& . 
tttd ddg /, &≡  denotes the growth rate of defense technology, and the function (.)f  satisfies the 
following regularity conditions 0)0( =f , 0>′f  for )1,0[, ∈tdh , 0)1( =′f  and 0≤′′f . The 
government’s balanced-budget condition is 
(12) tdtht hw ,,=τ . 
This setup can be interpreted as the case in which defense R&D is performed by the government 
and (11) is the government’s production function of defense technology. Alternatively, (12) can 
be viewed as cost-reimbursement contracts with defense firms. In this case, (.)f  is also affected 
by the incentives of defense firms in doing efficient R&D.11 Under either interpretation, a higher 
level of defense R&D increases tax burden and reduces available high-skill labor for production 
and civilian R&D (i.e., the crowding-out effect of defense R&D). 
 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Rogerson (1995) for a discussion on defense firms’ incentives under cost-based contracts. 
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3. Decentralized equilibrium 
This section firstly defines the equilibrium and then characterizes the balanced-growth path. The 
equilibrium is a sequence of allocations ∞=0,,,, }),(),(),(),(,,{ ttdtrtxtxttt hjhihilixyc , a sequence of 
prices ∞=0,, )}(,,,,{ ttttthtl ipvrww  and a sequence of tax policies 
∞
=0}{ ttτ . Also, at each instant of time, 
a. households choose }{ tc  to maximize utility subject to (2) taking },,,{ ,, ttthtl rww τ  as given;  
b. competitive final-goods firms produce }{ ty  to maximize profit taking )}({ ipt  as given;  
c. the leader in industry i produces )}({ ixt  and chooses )}(),(),({ ,, ihilip txtxt  to maximize 
profit according to the Bertrand competition and taking },{ ,, thtl ww  as given; 
d. R&D entrepreneur j chooses )}({ , jh tr  to maximize profit taking },{ , tth vw  as given;  
e. the market for final goods clears such that tt yc = ; 
f. the market for high-skill labor clears such that 1,,, =++ tdtrtx hhh ; 
g. the market for low-skill labor clears such that ll tx =, ; 
h. the government balances its budget constraint such that tdtht hw ,,=τ . 
 
3.1. Balanced-growth path 
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), the dynamics of the model is characterized by saddle-
point stability, so that the economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced-growth path. 
 
Lemma 1: Given a constant dh , the economy is on a unique and stable balanced-growth path. 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
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Given that the economy is on a balanced-growth path, we next derive the stationary equilibrium 
allocation of civilian R&D labor for a given dh . In summary, we use the zero-profit condition 
from the R&D sector and the resource constraint for high-skill labor to solve for rh . 
 
Lemma 2: The equilibrium allocation of civilian R&D labor is stationary and given by  
(13) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−−= θ
θ
ϕ
ρ
θ φ 11
1)1(
. zhz
zhh
d
dr . 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
The properties of rh  are quite intuitive. A larger markup z  increases the amount of 
monopolistic profit and the incentives for civilian R&D; therefore, rh  is increasing in z . A 
larger discount rate decreases the present value of an invention; therefore, rh  is decreasing in ρ . 
A larger θ  increases the usage of high-skill labor in production; therefore, rh  is decreasing in θ . 
A larger ϕ  increases R&D productivity and the incentives for civilian R&D; therefore, rh  is 
increasing in ϕ  for a given dh . As for defense R&D, it has contrasting effects on civilian R&D. 
On one hand, a larger dh  reduces the supply of high-skill labor in the market (i.e., the crowding-
out effect), and this is a negative effect on civilian R&D. On the other hand, a larger dh  raises 
R&D productivity φϕϕ dh.=  (i.e., the spillover effect), and this is a positive effect on civilian 
R&D. We impose a lower bound on ϕ  to ensure that rh  is positive. 
Condition R (R&D productivity): 
)1)(1(. −−> zhh ddφ
ρθϕ . 
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Substituting (4) into (3) yields the aggregate production function θθα −= 1xxttt lhdZy , where 
the aggregate level of civilian technology is defined as 
(14) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫∫ zdszdiinZ t stt lnexpln)(exp
0
1
0
λ . 
The second equality of (14) is obtained by using the law of large numbers. From (14), the growth 
rate of civilian technology is 
(15) zZZg ttz ln/ λ=≡ & , 
where rh.ϕλ =  is the aggregate arrival rate of innovation. Although the innovation process of 
each R&D entrepreneur is stochastic, the idiosyncratic uncertainty washes out at the aggregate 
level, and aggregate technology increases at a constant rate along the balanced-growth path. 
 
4. Growth and welfare effects of defense R&D 
Before analyzing the growth and welfare effects of defense R&D, we first establish a connection 
between defense R&D labor dh  in the model and defense R&D share of GDP that we observe in 
the data.  
 
Lemma 3: Defense R&D share of GDP is monotonically increasing in dh . 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
Next, we consider how dh  affects growth and welfare. Let’s denote the balanced-growth 
rate of consumption and output by ttttc yyccg // && =≡ . From the aggregate production function, 
(16) )(ln
1
)1)(1(
.
.
. d
dd
dzc hfzz
zhhggg αθ
ρθϕα
φ
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−−−=+= . 
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In this model, economic growth is driven by zg  (i.e., market-based civilian R&D as in standard 
R&D-based growth models) and dg  (i.e., government-financed public goods as in Barro (1990)). 
Suppose we suppress the spillover effect (i.e., 0=φ ) and the spinoff effect (i.e., 0=α ). Then, 
(16) shows that dh  only has a negative effect on growth through crowding out civilian R&D. 
When we allow for either a positive spillover effect (i.e., 0>φ ) or a positive spinoff effect (i.e., 
0>α ), (16) shows that dh  has a countervailing positive effect on growth. 
 
Proposition 1: There exists a growth-maximizing level of defense R&D *dh  that is increasing in 
φ  (the spillover effect of defense R&D) and α  (the spin-off effect of defense technology). A 
decrease in defense R&D has a positive (negative) effect on growth if dh  is above (below) 
*
dh . 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
Proposition 1 suggests that the reduction in defense R&D in the US should have 
ambiguous effects on growth. These ambiguous effects arise from the opposing forces of the 
crowding-out effect on civilian R&D versus the spillover and spin-off effects. Therefore, the 
growth-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in φ  (the spillover effect) and α  (the 
spin-off effect). Figure 2 plots the growth rate of consumption/output as a function of dh . 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
We next evaluate the effects of defense R&D on social welfare. Imposing the balanced-
growth condition on (1) simplifies the lifetime utility of households to  
(17)     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +++−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ρρ
δ
ρ
αθθρρρ
δ
ρρ
ddz
xx
dc ggghlgdgcU .lnln)1(1lnln1 00 , 
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where the second equality is obtained by dropping the exogenous 0Z  and 0d . Differentiating (17) 
with respect to dh  yields  
(18) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=∂
∂
d
d
d
d
d
z
d
x
xd h
g
h
g
h
g
h
h
hh
U
ρ
δαρ
θρ 1 . 
The last term in (18) captures the (positive) security-enhancing effect of defense technology on 
welfare. The first term in (18) captures the (negative) crowding-out effect of defense R&D on 
production that leads to a lower initial consumption xx hlc lnln)1(0 θθ +−= . Combining (13) 
and the resource constraint for high-skill labor yields  
(19) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−−−−= φφ ϕ
ρ
θ
θ
θ
θ
ϕ
ρ
θ dddddx hhzzhz
zhhh
..
1
111
1)1(1 , 
which is decreasing in dh . 
Suppose we suppress the security-enhancing effect (i.e., 0=δ ) and the crowding-out 
effect on production (i.e., 0=θ ). In this case, (18) shows that the growth-maximizing level of 
defense R&D is equivalent to the welfare-maximizing level. Suppose we allow 0>θ  while 
keeping 0=δ . In this case, defense R&D has a crowding-out effect on initial consumption. As a 
result, the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is below the growth-maximizing level. 
Suppose we allow 0>δ  while keeping 0=θ . In this case, defense R&D has a positive effect on 
nation security. As a result, the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is above the growth-
maximizing level. This special result resembles the one in Shieh et al. (2002). In general, when 
both the security-enhancing effect and the crowding-out effect on consumption are present, the 
welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D can be above or below the growth-maximizing level. 
To derive the cutoff value δ  at which the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing 
levels of defense R&D coincide, we firstly set (18) equal zero to derive the first-order condition 
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for welfare maximization. Then, we substitute the growth-maximizing *dh  into this condition to 
set dddz hghg ∂∂+∂∂ // .α  equal to zero. Finally, we rearrange terms to obtain the threshold  
(20) 0
*
>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
′∂
∂−≡
= dd hhxd
x
fhh
h ρθδ . 
 
Proposition 2: The welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in δ . Also, there 
exists a critical value δ  below (above) which the welfare-maximizing level is below (above) the 
growth-maximizing level. As θ  approaches zero, the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is 
above the growth-maximizing level for any value of 0>δ . 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
Proposition 2 shows that there is a welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D denoted by 
**
dh  that is increasing in δ , and there exists a critical value δ  below (above) which **dh  is below 
(above) the growth-maximizing level *dh  as illustrated in Figure 3. Intuitively, in addition to the 
growth effects, defense R&D has two additional effects on welfare (a) a negative effect on initial 
consumption and (b) a positive effect on national security. If national security is not very 
important to households (i.e., δδ < ), then (a) dominates (b) such that the welfare-maximizing 
level of defense R&D is below the growth-maximizing level. Otherwise, (b) dominates (a) such 
that the opposite is true.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper develops an R&D-based growth model to analyze the effects of defense R&D on 
growth and welfare. We find that the growth effect of defense R&D follows an inverted-U shape 
reflecting the opposing forces of the crowding-out effect on civilian R&D versus the spillover 
and spin-off effects. Also, whether or not the reduction in defense R&D in the US should have 
improved economic growth (social welfare) depends on the level of defense R&D in the 
economy relative to its growth-maximizing (welfare-maximizing) level, which in turn is 
determined by the spillover and spin-off effects (the security-enhancing effect). We also find that 
the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D can be above or below the growth-maximizing 
level. These theoretical results imply that even if defense R&D contributes to growth as 
suggested by recent empirical evidence, reducing defense R&D can still be consistent with either 
a positive or negative effect on social welfare. This finding suggests the importance of 
investigating beyond the growth effects when policymakers perform a cost-benefit analysis on 
defense R&D. Finally, the canonical quality-ladder model is a first-generation R&D-based 
growth model that exhibits scale effects (i.e., a larger economy experiences a higher growth rate). 
In this study, we set aside the issue of scale effects by normalizing the supply of skilled labor to 
unity.12 
 
                                                 
12 See Jones (1999) for an excellent discussion on scale effects in R&D-based growth model. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1: Given a constant dh  (and hence a constant ϕ ), the resource constraint for 
high-skill labor is trtxd hhh ,,1 +=− . The high-skill-labor share of final goods is zchw ttxth /.,, θ= . 
The arrival rate of innovation is trt h ,.ϕλ = . The zero-profit condition for R&D is tht wv ,=ϕ . 
Substituting these conditions into trtxd hhh ,,1 +=−  yields  
(A1) zh tdt /)1( θξϕλ −−= , 
where ttt vc /≡ξ  is a transformed variable. The law of motion for tξ  is  
(A2) ρλπξ
ξ −−=−= t
t
tx
t
t
t
t
t
t
vv
v
c
c ,&&& , 
where the second equality of (A2) uses (7) and the Euler equation. Substituting the profit share 
of final goods zzcttx /)1(, −=π  and (A1) into (A2) yields  
(A3) ρϕξθξ
ξ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−= )1(1 dt
t
t h
z
z& . 
The phase diagram for this simple differential equation is plotted in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows that 
tξ  must jump to its non-zero steady state given by )1/())1((* θρϕξ +−+−= zzhd . Otherwise, it 
would violate households’ utility maximization or firms’ profit maximization.□ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Imposing the balanced-growth condition on (7) yields  
(A4) )/(, λρπ += txtv . 
Substituting (A4), zzcttx /)1(, −=π  and rh.ϕλ =  into *ξ  yields (13).□  
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Proof of Lemma 3: In the model, defense R&D share of GDP is )/( dhdh hwyhw + . Substituting 
xxhxl hwlwy π++=  into this expression yields )/()/( dhxxhxldhdhdh hwhwlwhwhwyhw +++=+ π ,  
where λλρπ /)( += rhx hw  because rhx hwv ==+ λλρλπ )/(  from (A4) and (9). Furthermore, 
using θθ /)1/( xhxl hwlw =− , we have ))/(/)1(/()/( λρθθ rhhxhdhdhdh hwwhwhwhwyhw ++−=+ . 
Finally, )/1/)1(/()/( ϕρθθ ++−=+ xddhdh hhhwyhw  is increasing in dh .□ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Recall that )1,0(∈φ . Differentiating (16) with respect to dh  yields  
(A5) 0)(
1
ln)1(1)1( . =′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∂
∂
d
d
d
d
d
c hf
z
zz
h
hh
h
g αθ
ϕφφ , 
(A6) 0)(
1
ln)1(21)1( .12
2
<′′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=∂
∂
− d
d
d
dd
c hf
z
zz
h
h
hh
g αθ
ϕφφ φ . 
(A6) shows that cg  is strictly concave in dh . Therefore, the solution to (A5) denoted by 
*
dh  is a 
global maximum. Also, *dh  is an interior solution because (i) 0/ >∂∂ dc hg at 0=dh  and (ii) 
0/ <∂∂ dc hg  at 1=dh . Rearranging (A5) yields  
(A7) 0)(
1
ln)1(1)1( . =′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −− φαθ
ϕφ
d
d
d
d
h
hf
z
zz
h
h . 
Because the LHS of (A7) is decreasing in dh  and increasing in α  and φ , *dh  must be increasing 
in α  and φ . Recall that )1,0(∈dh  so that φdh  is decreasing in φ .□ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: From (16) and (19), we know that both xh  and cg  are independent of δ . 
Therefore, in (18), the marginal benefit of dh  is increasing in δ  while the marginal cost of dh  is 
Chu & Lai: Defense R&D 
 - 23 -
independent of δ . As a result, the welfare-maximizing **dh  must be increasing in δ . Also, **dh  is 
less than one because when dh  equals one, consumption equals zero given 0>θ . When δ  
equals zero, *** dd hh <  because 0/ <∂∂ dx hh  in (18). Let’s recall the definition of δ  from (20). 
When δ  equals δ , we have *** dd hh =  because 0/ =∂∂ dhU  at *dd hh =  in this case. When δδ > , 
we have *** dd hh >  because 0/** >∂∂ δdh . From (20), 00 => =θδδ  because  
(A8) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
+ φφ ϕ
ρ
ϕ
ρφ
d
d
dd
x
x h
h
hh
h
h ..
111 1  
from (19). Therefore, *** dd hh >  when 0>δ  and 0=θ .□ 
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Figure 1: Federal R&D on national defense as a percentage of US GDP
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Data sources: (a) National Science Foundation, and (b) Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Figure 2: Growth effects of defense R&D 
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Figure 4: Phase diagram 
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Figure 3: Growth-maximizing versus welfare-maximizing defense R&D 
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